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RECENT CASES
When the issue is next presented to a Missouri court it might heed the
words of Charles T. McCormick writing in 1925:
The ancient weapons, reshaped though they have been in
the attempt to fit them for modern uses, will at some future
day, one conjectures, be altogether thrown aside. [T]he law of
landlord and tenant will be assimilated to the law of contracts
generally.... No less certainly the logic, inescapable according
to the standards of a 'jurisprudence of conceptions," which
permits the landlord to stand idly by the vacant, abandoned
premises and treat them as the property of the tenant and re-
cover full rent, will yield to the more realistic notions of social
advantage which in other fields of the law have forbidden a
recovery for damages which the plaintiff by reasonable efforts
could have avoided. 91
CHARLEs F. MILLER
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Fincher v. Miles Homes of Missouri, Inc.'
On May 11, 1967, Lester Stacey entered into a contract to purchase
land from Jaurel Fincher for $1,200. A downpayment of $200 was to be
followed by monthly installments of $47.50. One week later Stacey
purchased pre-cut home materials from Miles Homes of Missouri, Inc.
(Miles Homes) and executed a promissory note secured by a deed of
trust on the tract of land described in the land contract. This deed of
trust was recorded in June, 1967. In May, 1972, Stacey was unable to
make further payments on the land contract. At Fincher's request Stacey
signed a preprinted statement on the land contract which acknowledged
his default and forfeiture of any remaining interest in the land. Fincher
took possession of the land and in September, 1973, instituted a suit to
quiet title in himself, naming Miles Homes and Stacey as defendants.
91. McCormick, supra note 10, at 222.
1. 549 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
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The trial court found that Stacey did not have a mortgagable inter-
est in the land and impressed the tract with an equitable lien 2 in favor
of Miles Homes. The Springfield District of the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals held that Stacey had the right to execute the deed of trust on his
interest in the land. It affirmed the decision of the trial court, however,
by holding that the mortgagee's (Miles Homes) rights were extinguished
when the mortgagor (Stacey) surrendered his rights under the land
contract. The case then was transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court
which reversed the court of appeals and held that the action of Stacey in
releasing his interest under the land contract did not terminate the
rights of Miles Homes under that contract. The court made a specific
finding that the vendor (Fincher) had actual knowledge of Miles Homes'
deed of trust.3 Consequently, because Miles Homes had not been
notified by Fincher of Stacey's upcoming forfeiture, Miles Homes' rights
under the deed of trust were not terminated.
The installment land contract is a land financing device used as a
substitute for a mortgage or deed of trust.4 The vendee goes into pos-
session and makes payments according to the contract terms, but legal
title to the land remains in the vendor. Upon receipt of the final pay-
ment, the vendor executes a deed to the vendee. The installment con-
tract has been favored by some vendors as a means of avoiding the ex-
pense and delay in enforcing their rights under other financing
methods. The main attraction of the installment land contract from the
vendor's point of view has been that the vendee in default forfeited all
his interest in the land.5 If the vendee failed to make payments the
vendor regained possession of the land and also retained all of the yen-
dee's prior payments. As an installment contract nears completion, this
type of forfeiture is difficult to distinguish from a penalty. Therefore,
although some states still permit forfeiture, the trend has been to treat
installment land contracts as mortgages, affording many of the tradi-
tional substantive rights granted mortgagors to vendees. Depending on
the jurisdiction, defaulting vendees have been granted various remedies.
Missouri courts have granted the right to specific performance upon
tender of the balance of the purchase price. 6 Other courts have per-
mitted the vendee to cure his default by paying arrearages on the con-
2. Id. at 849. The equitable lien was in the amount of $1,883.03 whereas
$3,988.76 was still due Miles Homes on the note.
3. Id. at 857.
4. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 44
(1976).
5. Porter, Installment Contracts for the Sale of Land in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. REv.
240 (1959); Warren, California Installment Land Sales Contracts: A Time for Reform,
9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 608 (1962).
6. Key v. Gregory, 553 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); Nigh v.
Hickman, 538 S.W.2d 936 (Mo. App., D.K.G. 1976).
[Vol. 43
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tract.7 In addition, courts have imposed the traditional mortgagor's
remedy of a public foreclosure sale. 8
In Fincher the Missouri court recognized that a vendee can mortgage
his interest in an installment land contract.9 The rights and protections
due the mortgagee when the vendee-mortgagor defaults on the under-
lying installment land contract are the issues presented in this note.
In order to preserve his rights to notice of an imminent forfeiture,
the vendee's mortgagee must give the vendor notice of the mortgagee's
interest.' 0 Several states have held that the mortgagee gives sufficient
notice of his interest to the vendor if the mortgage has been re-
corded."' These states follow a constructive notice rule which is based
either on an interpretation of the state forfeiture statute or on a combi-
nation of general principles of equity and the state recording statute.
Another line of authority has held that the vendor's duty to notify the
mortgagee of an upcoming forfeiture arises only if the vendor has actual
notice of the mortgage.' 2 A mortgagee who merely had recorded his
mortgage would be unable to have a forfeiture set aside on the ground
that he had had no notice. To protect himself, the mortgagee must give
actual notice of his interest to the vendor.
In Fincher the Missouri Supreme Court did not determine whether
Missouri should adopt the actual or constructive notice rule. The court
found that the vendor had actual knowledge of the interest of the
mortgagee. The court noted that the mortgage had been recorded, 3 but
the opinion emphasized the actual knowledge of the vendor. This may
be an indication of the potential for the future selection of the actual
notice rule in Missouri.
The better policy would be to protect the mortgagee's interest if the
mortgage has been recorded. 14 If the burden of providing actual notice
to the vendor is placed on the mortgagee and the mortgagee fails to
7. MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (Supp. 1977).
8. Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641, cert. denied, 415 U.S.
921 (1973); Powell, Reforming the Vendor's Remedies for Breach of Installment Land
Sale Contracts, 47 So. CAL. L. REv. 191 (1973).
9. See also Lewis v. Gray, 356 Mo. 115, 201 S.W.2d 148 (1947); 59 C.J.S.
Mortgages § 75e (1949).
10. Contra, Miles Homes, Inc. of Iowa v. Grant, 257 Ia. 697, 134 N.W.2d 569
(1965) (Iowa statute interpreted as never requiring the vendor to notify the
mortgagee of an upcoming forfeiture).
11. Davis v. Milligan, 88 Ala. 523, 6 So. 908 (1889); Stannard v. Marboe, 159
Minn. 119, 198 N.W. 127 (1924); Simonson v. Wenzel, 27 N.D. 638, 147 N.W.
804 (1914).
12. Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969).
13. 549 S.W.2d at 850.
14. Comment, Mortgages -Notice-Vendor and Purchaser-Vendor Not Charged
With Constructive Notice of Subsequent Mortgage of Contract Purchaser's Equity-
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prove such notice, his rights will be lost. As one commentator pointed
out: "It would be far more equitable to place a burden of notification on
the party who seeks to extinguish the rights of another completely, than
to penalize for failure to give notice one who seeks only the opportunity
to perform obligations under the contract."15 There are other reasons
why the constructive notice rule would be preferable. When a vendor
seeks forfeiture he usually consults an attorney. Mortgagees, however,
quite commonly give and record mortgages without the benefit of coun-
sel. The vendor's lawyer would have knowledge of a constructive notice
rule and would search the record for potential mortgages. A mortgagee
acting alone would lose his interest in the land by relying on the com-
monly accepted tenet that recording provides protection. Adoption of
the actual notice rule would reward ignorance. A vendor who did not
search the public record would be in a better position than one who
checked the jecord and discovered the mortgage.
Despite Fincher's actual knowledge of Miles Homes' interest, he did
not provide Miles Homes prior notice of the forfeiture. If a forfeiture
occurred under circumstances giving the mortgagee the right to prior
notice, courts have found that a forfeiture without notice does not im-
pair the rights of the mortgagee. 16 There is a split of authority, how-
ever, as to what these rights are.
Although not discussed in Fincher, authorities in the field of land
transactions have stated that the mortgagee of the vendee's interest
should acquire rights analogous to those possessed by a second
mortgagee in a normal first and second mortgage situation.1 7 The ven-
dor's right to payment under the installment contract would have prior-
ity over a mortgage of the vendee's interest and would be equated with a
senior mortgage.' 8 Therefore, if the mortgagee fails to receive notice of
a forfeiture of the vendee-mortgagor's interest in the installment con-
tract, his rights should be analogous to those of an omitted junior lienor
(second mortgagee). It has been noted that there are two principal rem-
15. Id. at 654.
16. See First Mortgage Corp. of Stuart v. de Give, 177 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1965);
Stannard v. Marboe, 159 Minn. 119, 198 N.W. 127 (1924); Sinclair v. Armitage,
12 N.J. Eq. 174 (1858); Knauss v. Miles Homes, Inc., 173 N.W.2d 896 (N.D.
1969); Simonson v. Wenzel, 27 N.D. 638, 147 N.W. 804 (1914); Sheehan v.
McKinstry, 105 Or. 473, 210 P. 167 (1922); Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456,
452 P.2d 222 (1969); Norlin v. Montgomery, 59 Wash. 2d 268, 367 P.2d 621
(1961). As to the effect of an intervening vendee, see Houghton v. Allen, 75 Cal.
102, 16 P. 532 (1888); Houghton v. Allen, 2 C.U. 780, 14 P. 641 (1887) (court
refused to preserve the mortgagee's rights). But see Davis v. Milligan, 88 Ala. 523,
6 So. 908 (1889); Sinclair v. Armitage, 12 N.J. Eq. 174 (1858).
17. Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Contract-A National Viewpoint, 1977
B.Y.U.L. Rzv. 573 (1977). In the usual mortgage situation the mortgagor has
title to the land which is security for two mortgages.
18. Id. at 574. See also Knauss v. Miles Homes, Inc., 173 N.W.2d 896, 904
(N.D. 1969) (Teigen, C.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 43
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edies available to a junior lienor who has not received notice of default
of the senior mortgage or of the resulting foreclosure.' 9 These available
remedies, foreclosure and redemption, permit the omitted lienor to
protect his interest in the land.
In foreclosure the first sale (where the junior lienor was omitted) is
ignored, and the land is sold at auction subject to the revived senior
mortgage. The purchaser at the first sale loses title to the land but is
deemed the holder of the revived senior mortgage. The purchaser at
this second sale takes the land subject to the revived senior mortgage.
Proceeds from the second sale go to pay the junior lienor, to the extent
of his interest in the land.
Under the redemption remedy the junior lienor must tender the
balance which was due on the senior mortgage at the time of the fore-
closure sale of which he had no notice. This is paid to the purchaser at
that sale and an assignment of the "revived" senior lien to junior lienor
is compelled. The junior lienor then owns two mortgages, either of
which may be foreclosed upon default of the purchaser. The junior
lienor does not acquire title to the land under either option unless he is
the high bidder at his own foreclosure sale.
The remedies available to the junior lienor can be overcome by the
purchaser at the first sale (who usually is the senior mortgagee). The
senior mortgagee 20 can overcome the junior lienor's remedies by invok-
ing his superior rights 2 1 of reforeclosure or redemption down. Under
reforeclosure the land again is sold, but this time the senior mortgagee
makes certain that all appropriate parties are joined. Proceeds from the
sale go first to the purchaser at the first sale in the amount of the first
mortgage, then to the junior lienor in the amount of his lien, with any
surplus going to the prior purchaser. In order to redeem down, the
purchaser at the first sale simply pays off the junior lien. Essentially, in
both remedies the purchaser at the sale at which the junior lienor was
omitted simply corrects the error at that initial sale. Thus, the rights of
the omitted lienor and the purchaser at the first sale are protected.
These types of remedies can be adapted to the installment land
contract situation. The vendor's interest under the installment contract
would be viewed as a vendor's lien. This lien would have priority over
the mortgage on the vendee's interest. The relationship between vendor
and mortgagee would be like that of senior mortgagee and junior lienor.
Under the omitted junior lienor remedies, the vendee's mortgagee
would have the same two basic options.2 2 The foreclosure option would
19. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 4, at 242-43.
20. If he was the high bidder at the prior foreclosure sale; the senior
mortgagee enforces these rights as a purchaser.
21. For an explanation of why the senior mortgagee is able to overcome the
remedies of the omitted junior lienor, see Nelson & Whitman, supra note 17.
22. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 17, at 574-75.
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allow the mortgagee to foreclose on the revived vendee's interest. High
bidder at the sale would acquire title subject to the vendor's right to
payment under the installment contract. 23 The redemption option
would require the mortgagee to pay the balance due on the defaulted
land contract to the vendor or his successor. The mortgagee thus would
acquire the vendor's rights under that contract as the vendor's as-
signee.2 4 Title would be vested in the vendee subject to two liens. Both
liens would be held by the vendee's mortgagee, one as the vendor's as-
signee and the other as mortgagee in the original mortgage transaction.
This would enable the mortgagee to foreclose on either or both liens.
As in the mortgage situation, however, the successor to the vendee's
interest 25 would have rights superior to those of the mortgagee and
would be able to overcome these actions by the mortgagee. The vendee's
successor could exercise reforeclosure (or the land contract equivalent
thereof),26 or he could redeem down. The first remedy probably would
require a judicial foreclosure on the land, this time with all parties
joined. Proceeds first would go to the vendor on the contract, then to
the mortgagee, and then to the vendee or his successor in interest. Re-
deeming down would require the vendee's successor in interest to pay
the balance owed by the vendee to the mortgagee. These remedies cor-
rect the omission of the mortgagee, and the transaction proceeds as if
notice had been given correctly in the first instance. The rights of the
mortgagee thus are protected upon default by the vendee.
Some jurisdictions have not adopted the first and second mortgage
analogy to the installment land contract situation; these decisions indi-
cate that the vendee's mortgagee can acquire title to the land simply by
paying the vendor what is due under the installment contract.27 Thus
the mortgagee is allowed to acquire title to the property absent the
functional equivalent of a foreclosure sale. While these decisions prop-
erly recognize that the mortgagee's rights should not be destroyed by his
mortgagor's land contract forfeiture, they overcompensate in the remedy
granted to the mortgagee. The intent of both the vendee-mortgagor and
the mortgagee is that the mortgagee receive a security interest in the
23. "The mortgage lien was upon the contract of purchase, and entitled him
to foreclose the mortgage, and have that contract sold for the satisfaction of the
mortgage." Alden v. Garver, 32 Il1. 32, 36 (1863).
24. See Sinclair v. Armitage, 12 N.J. Eq. 174 (1858); Sheehan v. McKinstry,
105 Or. 473, 210 P. 167 (1922) (redemption remedy granted).
25. The vendee's successor is analogous to the purchaser at a first mortgage
foreclosure sale of which the second mortgagee had no notice. He is the person
holding title to the land after the vendee has lost his rights under the contract.
This would be the vendor unless forfeiture involved the functional equivalent of
a foreclosure sale wherein a third party outbid the vendor.
26. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
27. First Mortgage Corp. of Stuart v. de Give, 177 So. 2d 741, 747 (Fla.
1965); Bank of Greensboro v. Clapp, 76 N.C. 482 (1877); Knauss v. Miles
Homes, Inc., 173 N.W.2d 896 (N.D. 1969).
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land. The above approach, however, allows the mortgagee to recover
more than the value of his secured loan when the value of the land
exceeds the sum of the amounts due on the mortgage and the install-
ment contract. This is clearly erroneous.
An opposing line of authority has limited the mortgagee's recovery
to the amount he was owed by the vendee-mortgagor.' 8 These decisions
require a foreclosure sale by the mortgagee. The vendor's rights are
protected by using the proceeds of the sale first to pay off the land
contract. A court also may require the mortgagee to pay the balance
owed to the vendor on the land contract before allowing the mortgagee
to conduct a foreclosure sale.29
In Fincher the Missouri Supreme Court, after determining that the
forfeiture of the vendee's interest was improper absent notice to the
mortgagee, gave the vendor two choices. 30 The vendor (Fincher) could
permit the mortgagee (Miles Homes) to cause a foreclosure sale of the
land. Proceeds first would go to satisfy the amount due Fincher on the
installment contract.3' Miles Homes then would receive proceeds up to
the amount secured by its deed of trust. Any remaining funds would go
to Fincher who, as successor to the interests of the vendee, acquired the
equitable interest in the land held by Stacey (the mortgagor-vendee).
The second option open to the vendor was to pay the vendee's debt to
the mortgagee. Fincher then would take unencumbered title to the land.
The Fincher court's remedies are consistent with use of the first and
second mortgage analogy. A senior mortgagee would have reforeclosure
and redemption down as possible alternatives to cure the omission of the
junior lienor. The Missouri court essentially gave these same alternatives
to the installment contract vendor in Fincher. Because the rights of the
vendor would be superior to the mortgagee's rights of redemption and
foreclosure under the first and second mortgage analogy, the court was
justified in speaking only in terms of the vendor's rights.
The decision in Fincher establishes that the interest of a vendee in an
installment land contract is mortgagable in Missouri. Although the stan-
dard for giving the installment contract vendor notice of such a
mortgage was not prescribed, there are indications in the opinion that
the court would favor an actual notice requirement. The better policy
arguments, however, favor a constructive notice standard. The most im-
portant aspect of this decision was the means used to protect the install-
ment contract mortgagee's rights when he has not received prior notice
of a forfeiture. The court properly limited the mortgagee's recovery to
28. Sheehan v. McKinstry, 105 Ore. 473, 210 P. 167 (1922); Norlin v.
Montgomery, 59 Wash. 2d 268, 367 P.2d 621 (1969).
29. Id.
30. 549 S.W.2d at 857.
31. Id. at 857. The first proceeds actually would go to pay the administrative
costs of conducting the sale.
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